Sunday, March 11, 2012
This is a fairly intense video. First of all - everyone lives, so that's nice.
This is a skydiving flight, normal right up until the pilot accidentally stalls the aircraft while slowing to let the jumpers out. The aircraft then spins, and while hilarity most definitely does not ensue, at least the cheesy soundtrack helps keep the mood light.
Looks like the pilot wasn't familiar with spin recovery. For those of you who aren't, if you ever happen to be sitting up in the cockpit and your view looks like the view of the guys in the airplane, maybe do this:
1. Neutralize the controls, ie move the control column to the neutral position, wings level.
2. Apply full rudder in the opposite direction of the spin. If you are spinning to the left, stomp on the right rudder and hold your foot to the floor until rotation stops.
3. You may need to check forward on the controls a wee bit to break the stall.
4. Once rotation stops, level the wings and ease out of the resulting dive, reducing power if necessary once above stall speed. Remember to ease out of the dive rather than reefing back on the controls and risking a secondary stall or airframe overstress.
You may notice that the magic ingredient is basically opposite rudder - your ailerons aren't gonna work so hot because in order to be spinning in the first place, at least one of the wings is stalled - thus the aileron on that wing isn't going to be very effective.
One thing: Some planes don't recover from spins, so you have to focus on not allowing them to ever spin in the first place. Other planes have non-standard stall / spin recovery techniques, so please be sure of the requirements of your particular airbeast when it comes to stall / spin recovery technique. It's not that hard, but it can save your life.
While I'm rambling on about stall / spin recovery, one of the fun things we do during our recurrent simulator training sessions is that we stall the airplane at night when we are down to minimums on a circling approach. It's an easy scenario and in my world that's one of the few times when the risk of an unintentional stall / spin is higher than zero.
What that means is we set the plane up to circle around an airport when we are only a few hundred feet above the ground, and we put our landing gear down and our flaps mostly down, just like they would be when we are landing. Then we fly parallel to the runway (downwind) and set the throttles to 50% or so, then wait. After a few seconds of deceleration, the plane stalls and it's up to us to get her flying again before we contact the planet a few hundred feet below us. The simulated planet that is - we would never try out a scenario like this in a real airplane. Anyway, stall recovery is a lot more visceral when you see buildings right below you than when we are at 5,000' (the normal minimum altitude for practicing stalls / spins) and it certainly motivates me to act quickly. The sim hasn't killed me yet, but it can certainly raise the hair on the back of my neck when the operator feels like loading me up to watch me sweat.
In our Citations we recover from most stall scenarios by just adding power, but with the gear and flaps down the plane is generating a lot of drag, and it takes a few seconds for the engines to kick up enough power to overcome it, so we can still lose a few hundred feet on a complicated stall recovery. I've had the radar altimeter in the sim call out "Ten" (feet above ground) on a recovery before, which certainly adds an element of intensity to the procedure.
If you have access to a flight sim, try stalling when low to the ground and then recovering. After all, isn't that when prompt and proper stall recovery is most important. Obviously nobody sane would ever do that in real life - simulated earth is a lot more forgiving than the real thing. I feel like a dope for even writing that, but I would hate for someone to read this post and then decide to do low altitude stalls on the basis of it and then have their next of kin sue me.
Taking our new plane out for a long run on Monday and Tuesday, so that will be cool.
Wednesday, March 07, 2012
Our new machine!

Main external differences between the 560 and the 550 Ultra are one extra window and the wing root on the ultra is swept back a wee bit. It's an entirely new wing actually, and it goes faster. New MMO is Mach 0.755 (vs 0.705 for the 550), or 292 KIAS (vs 262 KIAS for the 550). Engines are each 3045 lbs of thrust (vs 2500 on the 550) What that means in real life is the 560 Ultra can climb up to 40,000' right after takeoff, and it cruises about 90 knots faster.

When you walk in the door, you see a single seat now, instead of a 2-seat divan.

The galley is upgraded, and has lots of extra storage for snacks and drinks.

The seats are a new design. The cabin is 20 inches longer, which adds about 7 inches of extra legroom for each passenger.

Foldout tables, wheee! There's also a flitephone in the cabin, and audio controls for a CD changer in the back.

Because there is more space, even the rear seats have enough space for their own tables.

The lavatory / rear storage area has doors instead of a curtain!

The lavatory. It works. It also has a seatbelt and if we needed to, we could legally put a passenger there. Not too likely, but it's possible.

Coat hangars in the rear lav storage area. We also have a baggage compartment in the nose of the plane, and an extended baggage compartment in the tail, which can hold skis or golf clubs etc.

Here's the cockpit. The avionics are Primus 1000, with a GNS-XLS FMS (Flight Management System), which is the brains of the plane. I'll do some posts on the avionics. We also have some extra goodies, like a passenger briefing system - I press a button and a soothing voice comes across the speaker telling the pax to get ready for takeoff / landing etc.

But how does it perform? Here's 430 knots at FL410 (also known as 41,000' above sea level). When she was heavy she went to 425 knots, and after a couple of hours she was up to 436, which was bumping right up against her Mach 0.755 speed limit. Down below 40,000' I had to pull back the throttles to avoid overspeeding her. //Giggles like a schoolgirl.

Thinking about descending down to 28,000'. A quick shot of the panel in front of me.

Lunch in the air. Yeah, I'm Canadian :p

I used a panorama app on the iphone to take these next pics. Note that the picture stitching isn't 100% - we don't really have 2 overlapping panels on the copilot's side.

We took the plane to Teterboro NJ, which is where all New York corporate jets go into. The panorama app makes the wing look bendy, and the nose look stubby. I just wanted to show how many amazing corporate jets are in Teterboro on any given day - this is only a few of them.

We are taking the plane on a big trip next week, going from Toronto to Texas, Arizona and California, so that will be a great opportunity to stretch her legs and get more acquainted with her long-range performance. More to come!
Main external differences between the 560 and the 550 Ultra are one extra window and the wing root on the ultra is swept back a wee bit. It's an entirely new wing actually, and it goes faster. New MMO is Mach 0.755 (vs 0.705 for the 550), or 292 KIAS (vs 262 KIAS for the 550). Engines are each 3045 lbs of thrust (vs 2500 on the 550) What that means in real life is the 560 Ultra can climb up to 40,000' right after takeoff, and it cruises about 90 knots faster.
When you walk in the door, you see a single seat now, instead of a 2-seat divan.
The galley is upgraded, and has lots of extra storage for snacks and drinks.
The seats are a new design. The cabin is 20 inches longer, which adds about 7 inches of extra legroom for each passenger.
Foldout tables, wheee! There's also a flitephone in the cabin, and audio controls for a CD changer in the back.
Because there is more space, even the rear seats have enough space for their own tables.
The lavatory / rear storage area has doors instead of a curtain!
The lavatory. It works. It also has a seatbelt and if we needed to, we could legally put a passenger there. Not too likely, but it's possible.
Coat hangars in the rear lav storage area. We also have a baggage compartment in the nose of the plane, and an extended baggage compartment in the tail, which can hold skis or golf clubs etc.
Here's the cockpit. The avionics are Primus 1000, with a GNS-XLS FMS (Flight Management System), which is the brains of the plane. I'll do some posts on the avionics. We also have some extra goodies, like a passenger briefing system - I press a button and a soothing voice comes across the speaker telling the pax to get ready for takeoff / landing etc.
But how does it perform? Here's 430 knots at FL410 (also known as 41,000' above sea level). When she was heavy she went to 425 knots, and after a couple of hours she was up to 436, which was bumping right up against her Mach 0.755 speed limit. Down below 40,000' I had to pull back the throttles to avoid overspeeding her. //Giggles like a schoolgirl.
Thinking about descending down to 28,000'. A quick shot of the panel in front of me.
Lunch in the air. Yeah, I'm Canadian :p
I used a panorama app on the iphone to take these next pics. Note that the picture stitching isn't 100% - we don't really have 2 overlapping panels on the copilot's side.
We took the plane to Teterboro NJ, which is where all New York corporate jets go into. The panorama app makes the wing look bendy, and the nose look stubby. I just wanted to show how many amazing corporate jets are in Teterboro on any given day - this is only a few of them.
We are taking the plane on a big trip next week, going from Toronto to Texas, Arizona and California, so that will be a great opportunity to stretch her legs and get more acquainted with her long-range performance. More to come!
Tuesday, February 28, 2012
I'm sitting in Terminal 3 at Toronto Pearson right now, waiting to catch a Westjet flight to Calgary. That's where our new plane is, and I'll be flying her home tomorrow. I'll take lots of pics and videos on the return run so you can see how awesome she is.
In the meantime, here's a video from last night, when I saw my boy Nolan laugh for the first time. He really keeps things in perspective for me - I mean, I like my new plane, but I love my little boy more than life itself. And so will you once you see this clip!
In the meantime, here's a video from last night, when I saw my boy Nolan laugh for the first time. He really keeps things in perspective for me - I mean, I like my new plane, but I love my little boy more than life itself. And so will you once you see this clip!
Saturday, February 18, 2012

Yeah, it's been a while. Wanna know why? Because I have been stupid busy, that's why. What have I been busy with?
Before I answer that, let's talk airplane history for a second. The Citation II (which I fly)was upgraded and became the Citation Bravo, which was then expanded and turned into the Citation V, which was then upgraded and turned into the Citation Ultra.
How is this relevant? Well, we have sold my beloved C550, but we will continue to operate her for the new owner, and with the proceeds (and a whack of additional cash) we bought a Citation 560 Ultra!
Here's the wiki on the Citation 560 series
Here's a link to the actual plane we bought, serial 496
The Ultra is essentially 2 generations newer than the straight Citation II which I have been flying, and the Ultra we bought is 17 years younger, so it has lots of new features, which I'll be detailing over the next while.
The most noticeable ones are: It's about 90 knots faster, meaning we will true out at 430 knots at 40,000'. The airplane climbs a lot faster as well, and the level of automation is significantly increased. The engines produce a lot more thrust at 3045 lbs each instead of 2500 lbs on the II, and though they burn 200 gallons of gas per hour instead of 150 on the II, the extra speed means we actually have a net savings on fuel burn, especially when we fly into a headwind. The plane is about 2 feet longer, meaning more leg room for the pax in the back, and there are lots of upgrades to the interior (bigger food/beverage system, CD audio system, sat phone for pax, etc) It is quieter, and it can fly further, meaning we can head west for a fair distance without it being a whole ordeal.
Cosmetically, the airplane has an extra passenger window, the washroom has a real door instead of a curtain, the seats are fully rotating and pretty luxurious, the wing has a sweepback for the first few feet, and there is no tail de-ice boot (apparently Cessna noticed that the tail never actually accumulates ice on the 550 models and realized that there's no need for the boot, so they removed it)
Our parent company is expanding, and that means more flights to more locations, some of them a fair distance away. They own a lot of stuff in Arizona and California, and with the Ultra we will be able to save a few hours on each trip, so the time saving is significant.
Oh, the plane has EFIS as well, which means we watch tv screens up front instead of looking at analogue instruments.
Basically, it's a lot more airplane, and I'm really looking forward to learning the ins and outs of Ultra flying.
The process has been a pretty intense one, as our purchase of the Ultra was contingent on the sale of our II. Synchronizing those transactions likely took years off my life, but the cheque for the II cleared yesterday, so I'm confident enough in the process that I'm allowing myself to post this. I'm so excited!
I'm gonna detail most of the process in upcoming posts, because I sure learned a lot and I think that some of it is pretty valuable experience. For now, I'm gonna crack open a beer and relax for the first time in a month. Not to sound too high on myself, I have earned it! :)
Saturday, January 07, 2012
I leave the plane out for one single night in New Jersey, and this is what happens. I keed, I keed - she's down for her ten-thousand hour inspection. She will be in pieces for about a month while the mechanics do their thing. This is a huge inspection and they will be doing stuff I haven't seen before. For example, taking the tail off. Lots more pics and vids to come.
Wednesday, December 28, 2011
This continues from my last two (non-reindeer) posts, so read down to catch up.
I got a whole whack of information in this post from AvCanada, specifically the accident speculation thread. Stuff in quotes is taken verbatim from the discussion thread.
This is the ILS approach chart for Runway 35T into Resolute Bay. Do NOT use this to navigate, it's out-of-date now.

This is what the ILS into Resolute Bay looks like. The ceiling in this approach was 1,300':
On August 20th 2011, First Air flight 6560 was a 737 travelling from Yellowknife to Resolute Bay with 15 people on board, including four crew members. They called about 4 miles final for the runway, and then crashed a few minutes later. The aircraft appears to have been under control, and the surviving passengers reported nothing unusual right up to the point of impact.
The accident report hasn't come out yet, and the following stuff is entirely speculation - I want to make that clear. But I'm going to speculate.
METAR CYRB 202000Z 18009KT 8SM VCFG SCT003 OVC005 07/07 A2986 RMK
SF2SC5 VIS E-SE 3 FG SLP116=
The weather at the time of the accident was foggy with low (300') scattered and (500') overcast layers. People on the ground couldn't see much at all, but flight visibility can be very different from ground visibility.
We do know some things: The crew was still in control on three mile final, the engines were running, the aircraft is oriented parallel to the runway and level with the horizon, and the wreckage is strewn across a large area. If it had stalled or a mechanical failure had caused it to rapidly descend it would leave a much smaller impact area. That has all the hallmarks of classic CFIT, or 'controlled flight into terrain'.

Here's a Google earth view of the area around the accident. The wreckage trail is represented by the yellow line. The gully leading down from the nose of the aircraft at the end of the wreckage appears to contain the same washed out sort of area in google and the photo. The two red circles outline similar geometric forms. One is the approach end of 35T. The other is a road structure on a slightly sloping flat area elevated above the airport by about 325 feet and one mile to the right of the centerline of the runway. The lake to the southeast of the wreckage trail could appear in certain cloud arrangements to be similar to the shoreline on the approach to 35T.
The aircraft would have been between two layers of clouds with approximately 200 feet between layers, with the bottom scattered layer at 475 ASL and the top broken layer at 675 ASL. Some of what was a scattered layer from the weather observation point may have been broken in the hill above.
Now here's the thing: Even with the local terrain being a bit confusing, there should have been no problem finding the runway and landing with any normal kind of ILS approach, with a 500 foot ceiling. ILS tolerances are pretty tight, and it would be really hard to conceive why the aircraft would have been a mile to the right of its course, and more or less on runway heading without any abnormal indications to the crew.
Let's add some more information: here's another picture of the accident site, this time with the Resolute VOR location plotted. This one chills my bones.

It turns out the ILS was functional on that day, but suppose the crew didn't get a glideslope indication and decided to fly the Localizer only approach. That takes them down to 540' ASL. The ridge they hit was 653' ASL.
The step down approach (localizer) really comes into the equation if the aircraft is mistakenly inbound on the 167T radial from YRB. In that scenario, the crew believes it is tuned to the ILS, can't get glideslope, and switches to a localizer approach with the final drop only 160 feet four miles back. They keep tracking the 167T radial as if it were the localizer. They don't have glideslope because they're tuned to 112.1 instead of 110.3. Their DME is coming off the VOR.
"In the mistuned VOR scenario, they have to have POKAN on the 167 radial at 4 DME, a mile east of proper track. Then do the procedure turn and fly back inbound on the false localizer. Maybe they left the VOR eastbound with 167 already set on the OBS, flew it needle centered to the false POKAN, did the PT and re-intercepted inbound. Get no GS, maybe call it in U/S, and fly the localizer approach instead. That scenario ends exactly where the accident happened.
I can't see a late tuning of the VOR and nobody noticing that the needle moved when the OBS was turned. If they'd been tracking 167 outbound to Pokan, and then set up the inbound course on the CDI, they wouldn't have noticed it so much as they would have been in the PT where they would expect it to be deflected."
An added factor now: Has anyone noticed that there is no missed approach point for the LOC/DME approach on the ILS/DME 35T plate? Not on the DND copies anyway. Take a look.
A second factor: Notice how the VOR isn't even depicted on the ILS chart? Why on earth would the crew have it tuned in? Well, a couple of possibilities exist. There was a temporary military control tower at Resolute that day, coordinating aircraft that were participating in a mock search-and-rescue exercise. The control tower was asking other aircraft for their radial and distance to the airport, and the accident aircraft had reported that information to the control tower fairly late in their approach. In order to report that information they would have had to tune in the VOR. The other possibility is that maybe they were using the VOR to navigate to the airport before commencing the approach.
"Another Canadian carrier used to have an unofficial procedure on the 737-200. If you wanted to retain the DME display while doing an ILS, you would tune #1 to the ILS and #2 to the VOR. Then you would transfer the display [overhead switch] to "both on 1" Now, both pilots would have their HSI displaying the info from the #1 radio, and the dme would readout from the vor still tuned on the #2 radio. This practice was banned after a crew mistakenly switched "both on 2" during an approach to Prince George. Thinking they were tracking the LOC, the aircraft descended towards the YXS VOR and very nearly had an accident. [With both radios tuned to the ILS you would not have a DME readout and there is no DME hold switch on the 200] The practice of transferring the display was then banned and to be used only in case of radio failure. Keep in mind that was another air carrier, not First Air."
Here's a pic of the panel from the actual accident aircraft.

Hmm, same switches.
But wouldn't their GPWS (Ground Proximity Warning System) have saved them? The 737 in question was equipped with an older model, which basically gives no warnings once the landing gear is down. GPWS will only give you two calls "500'" and "Sink Rate", whereas the newer Enhanced GPWS will give 1000', 500' 100', 50', 40', 30', 20', and 10' above ground calls. This late in the approach, the gear would have been down.
So here's my speculation: With the knowledge that the military was asking for radials/DME bearings prior to the crash, maybe the VOR was tuned in, thinking they had the ILS frequency up. Now to those of you who fly IFR, how often have you made a late change in the approach? It happens to me once in a while. If you thought you had the ILS tuned in and once on the approach you had a G/S flag, it would be a fast and easy brief to re-brief for the LOC only approach and continue to the higher minumums (especially in an environment such as the Arctic airports)...if that was the case here, the LOC only minimums still would have put them into a hill if they were tracking the VOR.
One final pic:

This was taken on the LOC DME BC approach to rwy 17T (the accident runway, just landing in the opposite direction) in 2009. The distance to the rwy threshold is less than 1.5NM. Can you spot the runway? Imagine looking for that in low cloud and fog, let alone adding being on the wrong approach frequency.
Lots of links in the accident chain on this one, and again the final report hasn't come out yet - but if it went even remotely close to how I think it went, you can see the tragedy that resulted from a bunch of different factors that added up all at once.
I got a whole whack of information in this post from AvCanada, specifically the accident speculation thread. Stuff in quotes is taken verbatim from the discussion thread.
This is the ILS approach chart for Runway 35T into Resolute Bay. Do NOT use this to navigate, it's out-of-date now.

This is what the ILS into Resolute Bay looks like. The ceiling in this approach was 1,300':
On August 20th 2011, First Air flight 6560 was a 737 travelling from Yellowknife to Resolute Bay with 15 people on board, including four crew members. They called about 4 miles final for the runway, and then crashed a few minutes later. The aircraft appears to have been under control, and the surviving passengers reported nothing unusual right up to the point of impact.
The accident report hasn't come out yet, and the following stuff is entirely speculation - I want to make that clear. But I'm going to speculate.
METAR CYRB 202000Z 18009KT 8SM VCFG SCT003 OVC005 07/07 A2986 RMK
SF2SC5 VIS E-SE 3 FG SLP116=
The weather at the time of the accident was foggy with low (300') scattered and (500') overcast layers. People on the ground couldn't see much at all, but flight visibility can be very different from ground visibility.
We do know some things: The crew was still in control on three mile final, the engines were running, the aircraft is oriented parallel to the runway and level with the horizon, and the wreckage is strewn across a large area. If it had stalled or a mechanical failure had caused it to rapidly descend it would leave a much smaller impact area. That has all the hallmarks of classic CFIT, or 'controlled flight into terrain'.

Here's a Google earth view of the area around the accident. The wreckage trail is represented by the yellow line. The gully leading down from the nose of the aircraft at the end of the wreckage appears to contain the same washed out sort of area in google and the photo. The two red circles outline similar geometric forms. One is the approach end of 35T. The other is a road structure on a slightly sloping flat area elevated above the airport by about 325 feet and one mile to the right of the centerline of the runway. The lake to the southeast of the wreckage trail could appear in certain cloud arrangements to be similar to the shoreline on the approach to 35T.
The aircraft would have been between two layers of clouds with approximately 200 feet between layers, with the bottom scattered layer at 475 ASL and the top broken layer at 675 ASL. Some of what was a scattered layer from the weather observation point may have been broken in the hill above.
Now here's the thing: Even with the local terrain being a bit confusing, there should have been no problem finding the runway and landing with any normal kind of ILS approach, with a 500 foot ceiling. ILS tolerances are pretty tight, and it would be really hard to conceive why the aircraft would have been a mile to the right of its course, and more or less on runway heading without any abnormal indications to the crew.
Let's add some more information: here's another picture of the accident site, this time with the Resolute VOR location plotted. This one chills my bones.

It turns out the ILS was functional on that day, but suppose the crew didn't get a glideslope indication and decided to fly the Localizer only approach. That takes them down to 540' ASL. The ridge they hit was 653' ASL.
The step down approach (localizer) really comes into the equation if the aircraft is mistakenly inbound on the 167T radial from YRB. In that scenario, the crew believes it is tuned to the ILS, can't get glideslope, and switches to a localizer approach with the final drop only 160 feet four miles back. They keep tracking the 167T radial as if it were the localizer. They don't have glideslope because they're tuned to 112.1 instead of 110.3. Their DME is coming off the VOR.
"In the mistuned VOR scenario, they have to have POKAN on the 167 radial at 4 DME, a mile east of proper track. Then do the procedure turn and fly back inbound on the false localizer. Maybe they left the VOR eastbound with 167 already set on the OBS, flew it needle centered to the false POKAN, did the PT and re-intercepted inbound. Get no GS, maybe call it in U/S, and fly the localizer approach instead. That scenario ends exactly where the accident happened.
I can't see a late tuning of the VOR and nobody noticing that the needle moved when the OBS was turned. If they'd been tracking 167 outbound to Pokan, and then set up the inbound course on the CDI, they wouldn't have noticed it so much as they would have been in the PT where they would expect it to be deflected."
An added factor now: Has anyone noticed that there is no missed approach point for the LOC/DME approach on the ILS/DME 35T plate? Not on the DND copies anyway. Take a look.
A second factor: Notice how the VOR isn't even depicted on the ILS chart? Why on earth would the crew have it tuned in? Well, a couple of possibilities exist. There was a temporary military control tower at Resolute that day, coordinating aircraft that were participating in a mock search-and-rescue exercise. The control tower was asking other aircraft for their radial and distance to the airport, and the accident aircraft had reported that information to the control tower fairly late in their approach. In order to report that information they would have had to tune in the VOR. The other possibility is that maybe they were using the VOR to navigate to the airport before commencing the approach.
"Another Canadian carrier used to have an unofficial procedure on the 737-200. If you wanted to retain the DME display while doing an ILS, you would tune #1 to the ILS and #2 to the VOR. Then you would transfer the display [overhead switch] to "both on 1" Now, both pilots would have their HSI displaying the info from the #1 radio, and the dme would readout from the vor still tuned on the #2 radio. This practice was banned after a crew mistakenly switched "both on 2" during an approach to Prince George. Thinking they were tracking the LOC, the aircraft descended towards the YXS VOR and very nearly had an accident. [With both radios tuned to the ILS you would not have a DME readout and there is no DME hold switch on the 200] The practice of transferring the display was then banned and to be used only in case of radio failure. Keep in mind that was another air carrier, not First Air."
Here's a pic of the panel from the actual accident aircraft.

Hmm, same switches.
But wouldn't their GPWS (Ground Proximity Warning System) have saved them? The 737 in question was equipped with an older model, which basically gives no warnings once the landing gear is down. GPWS will only give you two calls "500'" and "Sink Rate", whereas the newer Enhanced GPWS will give 1000', 500' 100', 50', 40', 30', 20', and 10' above ground calls. This late in the approach, the gear would have been down.
So here's my speculation: With the knowledge that the military was asking for radials/DME bearings prior to the crash, maybe the VOR was tuned in, thinking they had the ILS frequency up. Now to those of you who fly IFR, how often have you made a late change in the approach? It happens to me once in a while. If you thought you had the ILS tuned in and once on the approach you had a G/S flag, it would be a fast and easy brief to re-brief for the LOC only approach and continue to the higher minumums (especially in an environment such as the Arctic airports)...if that was the case here, the LOC only minimums still would have put them into a hill if they were tracking the VOR.
One final pic:

This was taken on the LOC DME BC approach to rwy 17T (the accident runway, just landing in the opposite direction) in 2009. The distance to the rwy threshold is less than 1.5NM. Can you spot the runway? Imagine looking for that in low cloud and fog, let alone adding being on the wrong approach frequency.
Lots of links in the accident chain on this one, and again the final report hasn't come out yet - but if it went even remotely close to how I think it went, you can see the tragedy that resulted from a bunch of different factors that added up all at once.
Monday, December 26, 2011
Wednesday, December 21, 2011
I'm referencing my last post, so read down to get caught up.
Those of you who guessed there may have been some confusion with the Teterboro VOR and ILS frequencies, you win a cookie!
The inbound ILS course was set, but when the non-flying pilot read the chart and saw the TEB frequency in the 108 mhz range, he thought "108 is an ILS frequency", and tuned it and identified it. It's not quite that simple,so I'll paraphrase from Wiki:
VORs are assigned radio channels between 108.0 MHz and 117.95 MHz. Turns out the first 4 MHz is shared with the ILS band though. To leave channels for ILS, in the range 108.0 to 111.95 MHz, the 100 kHz digit (the first decimal place) is always even, so 108.00, 108.05, 108.20, and so on are VOR frequencies but 108.10, 108.15, 108.30, and so on, are reserved for ILS.
I didn't know that, but now I do. 108.4 would be a VOR because the .4 is even, where 108.9 would be an ILS because the .9 is not. I learn something new every day, and it's a good way to add a cross-check to the frequency being selected.
As we weren't expecting to see a glideslope indication (the G/S being out of service on this particular day), no warning flares went up right away.
Fortunately for us we were in good weather so we saw the airport a fair ways back, and got aligned with the runway, then discovered our mistake. Also fortunate for us, we were in a radar environment with ATC services, so if we had gone off-course in any major way (or even a minor way, this being among the busiest airspace on the planet), ATC would have let us know.
So how do we prevent this from happening again? Well, with SMS we ask ourselves a bunch of "whys".
Why were we off course? The wrong frequency was entered by the non-flying pilot on the approach.
Why was the wrong frequency entered? The non-flying pilot misread the chart and didn't see the correct frequency.
Why did he misread the chart? From his previous flight experience, he assumed a 108.** frequency would be an ILS (the desired approach), and didn't read further to the right of the chart where the ILS frequency was. It doesn't help that most people read from left to right, and the box on the left was the VOR, while the box on the right was the ILS. A contributing factor was that this was his first trip into the airport.
Why didn't the other pilot catch that in the approach briefing? Because our SOP's dictated that the non-flying pilot is solely responsible for entering the approach frequencies into our radios. A contributing factor was the Glideslope was out of service, so nobody was expecting to see it, the lack of which normally would have been an early indicator of something not-quite-right on the approach.
A-ha! The first part of that last paragraph seems to show a weakness on the part of our procedures - we had just one pilot in charge of confirming the information in the box, and while it had served us for a decade, this incident showed us that it could be improved. I immediately issued a memo stating that from now on, both pilots shall confirm the proper radio frequency is entered into the navigation radios prior to the start of the approach. We have added standard phraseology to our approach briefings "Radio tuned and identified to ***** (whatever the appropriate frequency is), Confirm?" The other pilot will physically point to the approach chart with the desired frequency and then to the nav radio, then both will listen to the proper approach ident, followed by "Confirmed". This will put both pilots more in the loop when it comes to entering this data into the box, which will add an extra layer of protection into our approach procedures.
Tomorrow we will talk about another aircraft that *appears* to have made a chillingly similar error, but with considerably more tragic results. It's pretty fascinating, and from our recent experience I totally get how it could occur. I'm talking about First Air flight 6560, which crashed in August of this year. More tomorrow.
Those of you who guessed there may have been some confusion with the Teterboro VOR and ILS frequencies, you win a cookie!
The inbound ILS course was set, but when the non-flying pilot read the chart and saw the TEB frequency in the 108 mhz range, he thought "108 is an ILS frequency", and tuned it and identified it. It's not quite that simple,so I'll paraphrase from Wiki:
VORs are assigned radio channels between 108.0 MHz and 117.95 MHz. Turns out the first 4 MHz is shared with the ILS band though. To leave channels for ILS, in the range 108.0 to 111.95 MHz, the 100 kHz digit (the first decimal place) is always even, so 108.00, 108.05, 108.20, and so on are VOR frequencies but 108.10, 108.15, 108.30, and so on, are reserved for ILS.
I didn't know that, but now I do. 108.4 would be a VOR because the .4 is even, where 108.9 would be an ILS because the .9 is not. I learn something new every day, and it's a good way to add a cross-check to the frequency being selected.
As we weren't expecting to see a glideslope indication (the G/S being out of service on this particular day), no warning flares went up right away.
Fortunately for us we were in good weather so we saw the airport a fair ways back, and got aligned with the runway, then discovered our mistake. Also fortunate for us, we were in a radar environment with ATC services, so if we had gone off-course in any major way (or even a minor way, this being among the busiest airspace on the planet), ATC would have let us know.
So how do we prevent this from happening again? Well, with SMS we ask ourselves a bunch of "whys".
Why were we off course? The wrong frequency was entered by the non-flying pilot on the approach.
Why was the wrong frequency entered? The non-flying pilot misread the chart and didn't see the correct frequency.
Why did he misread the chart? From his previous flight experience, he assumed a 108.** frequency would be an ILS (the desired approach), and didn't read further to the right of the chart where the ILS frequency was. It doesn't help that most people read from left to right, and the box on the left was the VOR, while the box on the right was the ILS. A contributing factor was that this was his first trip into the airport.
Why didn't the other pilot catch that in the approach briefing? Because our SOP's dictated that the non-flying pilot is solely responsible for entering the approach frequencies into our radios. A contributing factor was the Glideslope was out of service, so nobody was expecting to see it, the lack of which normally would have been an early indicator of something not-quite-right on the approach.
A-ha! The first part of that last paragraph seems to show a weakness on the part of our procedures - we had just one pilot in charge of confirming the information in the box, and while it had served us for a decade, this incident showed us that it could be improved. I immediately issued a memo stating that from now on, both pilots shall confirm the proper radio frequency is entered into the navigation radios prior to the start of the approach. We have added standard phraseology to our approach briefings "Radio tuned and identified to ***** (whatever the appropriate frequency is), Confirm?" The other pilot will physically point to the approach chart with the desired frequency and then to the nav radio, then both will listen to the proper approach ident, followed by "Confirmed". This will put both pilots more in the loop when it comes to entering this data into the box, which will add an extra layer of protection into our approach procedures.
Tomorrow we will talk about another aircraft that *appears* to have made a chillingly similar error, but with considerably more tragic results. It's pretty fascinating, and from our recent experience I totally get how it could occur. I'm talking about First Air flight 6560, which crashed in August of this year. More tomorrow.
Sunday, December 18, 2011

Something happened recently that I want to share with you. We made a mistake, and learned from it. As part of our SMS (Safety Management System), when we make mistakes we try to identify the root cause, and then come up with a way to mitigate the situation so we don't make the same mistake in the future.
We fly to KTEB, Teterboro New Jersey, a lot. It's where most of the corporate jets go when they have passengers who wish to do business in downtown Manhattan. It's about a 30-40 minute drive from the airport to Wall Street, and the airport has less congestion than Newark, JFK or La Guardia.
A little while ago, the plane did a KTEB trip. It was an early-morning departure, and the weather was fine. The approach in use was the ILS (Instrument Landing System) to runway 06. On a full ILS approach, the radio signal lines you up with the runway and also tells you when to descend, and if you are high or low on your descent angle. The ILS approach is the most common instrument approach in most large airports, because most airplanes that use it can fly down to 200' above the ground without looking outside, and on some advanced ILS approaches, some sophisticated airplanes can use the radio signal to fly right down onto the runway without looking outside at all - pretty handy in places like Boston or Vancouver where it can get pretty foggy.
The only unusual variable on this trip was that the ILS for runway 06 had the glideslope radio signal out of service, so the approach only offered lateral guidance, ie it would only line you up with the runway, and you had to use alternate methods to calculate when to descend.
http://www.airnav.com/depart?http://204.108.4.16/d-tpp/1113/00890IL6.PDF
That's a link to the ILS approach onto runway 06, so you can follow along in glorious hi-res if you have a .pdf reader.
This next part is kinda technical, and I can`t figure out how to make it less so for non-pilots, but I`ll have a summary afterwards so bear with me.
The approach is pretty straight-forward - Air Traffic Control will give you radar vectors to intercept the inbound track, which is an angle of 060 degrees to the airport. They usually angle you so that you intercept the approach track at Vings intersection. Now there are a few ways to verify that you are at Vings intersection. One way is to put the waypoint in your GPS receiver, another way is to put the 294 degree radial off the JFK VOR and the 080 degree radial off Solberg VOR and fly over where they cross each other, but another way is to dial in the TEB VOR and when you are on the localizer and at 12.5 DME (taken from the VOR), then you are at Vings. The last way is the way we chose to identify Vings.
In our SOP`s (Standard Operating Procedures), the pilot flying (the guy in the left seat) will brief the approach and the non-flying pilot will tune and identify the radios. This was done, but as the plane approached the airport, it became obvious that the airplane wasn`t quite where it should be. The weather was good, so the pilot flying was able to see the runway about 20 miles back, and lined the airplane up with it nicely.
The thing is, the navigation radios were saying that the airplane was pretty far to the left of the runway, and this caused some confusion in the cockpit. I happened to be sitting in the back on this flight, watching the flight crew, and I was also confused for a few seconds.
Take a long hard look at the approach plate, and see if you can figure out the mistake that was made. Keep in mind that the glideslope was out of service for the ILS, so we weren`t expecting to see any glidepath information, nor did we.
//edit - to add a little information, the plane was showing off-track by only a few degrees, but our localizer indicator was showing nearly full deflection even though we were lined up with the runway. As mentioned earlier, the weather was fine so the briefing was for the visual approach backed up by the Localizer (the localizer is the ILS system without the glidepath system). The pilot flying had flown this approach probably a hundred times in the past few years, but this was the first time the non-flying pilot had been into Teterboro.//
I`ll talk about what happened next tomorrow.
Saturday, November 19, 2011
Friday, November 18, 2011
The portable XM iPad weather works great on the ground and in my car, but we don't fly til Sunday so I won't have an airborne assessment for another couple of days.
Let's watch an airplane get hit by lightning while we wait. The difference here is that the airplane is parked on the ramp. Watch it in 480p and fullscreen so you don't miss the tiny details.
From a post on AvCanada by ktcanuk called "Why your bags are delayed in a thunderstorm" :
"An AeroRepublica Embraer 190 hit by lightning in Medellin, Colombia at the gate. You'll need to watch it several times to see all of the action; It’s only about 10 seconds duration. Three key things/areas to watch. First watch the tail of the aircraft as the lightning bolt hits the vertical stabilizer, do not blink, it happens that fast. Next, watch the nose of the aircraft where ground crew walk up to and under the nose of the airplane, then quickly retreat. Then, look just to your left of the nose gear. That brown square on the ground is a metal plate imbedded in the concrete, with an access cover in it. The lightning strike exits the airplane onto the metal plate, which sends the access cover flying through the air toward the tug on the far left."
Let's watch an airplane get hit by lightning while we wait. The difference here is that the airplane is parked on the ramp. Watch it in 480p and fullscreen so you don't miss the tiny details.
From a post on AvCanada by ktcanuk called "Why your bags are delayed in a thunderstorm" :
"An AeroRepublica Embraer 190 hit by lightning in Medellin, Colombia at the gate. You'll need to watch it several times to see all of the action; It’s only about 10 seconds duration. Three key things/areas to watch. First watch the tail of the aircraft as the lightning bolt hits the vertical stabilizer, do not blink, it happens that fast. Next, watch the nose of the aircraft where ground crew walk up to and under the nose of the airplane, then quickly retreat. Then, look just to your left of the nose gear. That brown square on the ground is a metal plate imbedded in the concrete, with an access cover in it. The lightning strike exits the airplane onto the metal plate, which sends the access cover flying through the air toward the tug on the far left."
Friday, November 11, 2011

The iPad has truly revolutionized aviation. I can use it as a moving map, look up airport data, file flight plans and do all sorts of useful and relevant activities.
'real' iPad post coming up next week when our airborne XM weather hardware arrives- I just ordered the Mobile Link package from Baron Systems - it will apparently stream XM weather from the receiver via wifi to my iPad. Gonna use the Foreflight Mobile HD app, which has geo-referenced US approach charts, Canadian charts, and will display the weather right on the charts. At least, that's my hope. We have on-board XM weather already, but it's through a 6-year-old tablet PC that's cranky at the best of times, so I'm hoping for something a little more stable. Next week will tell!
Friday, November 04, 2011
This is why people fly private.
I'm in Orlando at the moment, after dropping the plane off here for a few days, and I'm trying to fly home on Air Canada. As you can see from the pic, the flight is delayed. No big deal there, I understand that planes go mechanical and that sometimes weather can be a factor.
Here's what angers me though: The display is essentially useless: there is no revised ETA. Oh, and no actual human being to talk to either. I took this pic AFTER our scheduled departure time, and we still haven't seen a gate agent or AC rep. If I displayed a similar lack of concern for my clients I'd be out of a job pretty freakin' fast, I can tell you that.
Oh well, at least I can more fully consider my options next time I book a commercial airline ticket. Yeah, I sound bitchy - I'm away from Lisa and Nolan for the first time since he was born, and I don't know when I'm getting home. C'mon Air Canada, get your act together!
I'm fairly proactive when it comes to stuff like this, so I sent a copy of my pic to the Air Canada customer feedback website. This is the reply I got:
------------------------------
Thank you for contacting us.
This is to confirm that we have received your correspondence and there is no requirement to re-submit your information. Our processing time is currently 20 business days for general customer concerns, 30 business days for baggage related issues and up to 4 weeks for baggage tracing. We will make every effort to respond sooner.
We appreciate your patience and understanding as you await our response.
---------------------------
Oh Em Eff Gee. Why even have a customer feedback website if you are going to have delays like that? It only enrages me further...
//continues to grumble about the sorry state of airline travel under his breath...
Tuesday, October 25, 2011
First of all, here's a pic of Nolan being philosophical while wearing a monkey hat. I'm absolutely in love, even though he's currently living life on Australian time :)
Now this is kind of a total bait n' switch on my part because this next Youtube video is one of the most tense and disturbing things I have ever listened to. *SPOILER* The guys live. I'm saying this ahead of time because otherwise it would be pretty unbearable listening. I found this video posted on AvCanada.
This is a Mitsubishi MU-2 in severe icing, over the mountains, trying to make it to Kelowna BC. Kelowna is in a valley, with high mountains all around.
The MU-2 has gotten a pretty bad reputation in icing, in fact it was subject to a full icing recertification review after some high-profile accidents. The review found that the MU-2 was properly certified for flight into icing, and that it's perfectly safe to fly in light-to-moderate icing as long as you follow the proper procedures. If you disrespect the airplane in icing, you will hear the angels singing sooner rather than later. I'm absolutely NOT saying that's what happened in this situation, it sounds to me like they were doing everything right but got caught in severe icing, which by definition will even overwhelm icing equipment that's working properly.
If you check the first part of this video, you'll hear the the guys picked up a lot of icing, and it caused a propellor imbalance. That can cause some serious vibration, to the point of the prop departing the aircraft. The only solution is to reduce power (and descend), or keep the power up and hope the plane doesn't shake apart. A hell of a choice.
I flew the MU-2 for just over a thousand hours, and my older blog entries are full of stories about it. A beautiful machine, but particularly unforgiving.
Monday, October 17, 2011
Welcome Nolan! Weighing in at 7 lbs 5 ounces and scoring a perfect 9/9 on his APGAR test, he entered the world at 830 this morning with a mighty roar. Happy birthday to our champion son! Man, I have never felt an adrenaline rush like that before in my life. I have also never cried like that before in my life. Such a primal rush! Both baby and mom are doing great - they are napping and I'm riding an endorphin high that's taking me into low-earth orbit.
Now back to staring at him while he sleeps...
Now back to staring at him while he sleeps...
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)



